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Abstract
This paper investigates an insurance market with adverse selection, moral hazard
and across-contract endogeneity, under monopoly and perfect competition. We
characterize the equilibrium in a market without endogeneity and study how the
introduction of across-contract endogeneity into the model distorts the optimal
contracts. The across-contract endogeneity can be viewed as a second source of
endogeneity, in addition to moral hazard, that further reduces insurance coverage
if the insurer considers its implication when choosing contracts. We show that a
monopolist internalizes the externality exerted by the contracts and offers contracts
with less coverage, which induce a lower level of average risk. Competitive insurers
fail to account for the interdependence of risks and do not adjust accordingly. They
offer excessive insurance, which leads to a higher level of average risk and creates
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1 Introduction
Insurance markets have been of interest to economists because of asymmetric in-
formation. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that an equilibrium may not exist in a
competitive insurance market with pure adverse selection when there are too few high-risk
individuals in the market. Since then, there have been different attempts to understand
the insurance market by modifying the equilibrium concept and introducing interactions
between the insurers and the insured. Others have addressed the problem of moral haz-
ard in an insurance market. Shavell (1979) discusses the optimal insurance coverage in a
market with moral hazard and studies the condition for partial coverage to be provided.
Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) show that differential commodity taxation can remedy the
market failure caused by moral hazard.
This paper studies the insurance market with interdependent risks under monopoly
and perfect competition. With across-contract endogeneity of risks, a contract offered by
the insurer to one agent exerts an externality on other agents in the market. Specifically,
we consider how the externality influences other agents’ choice of self-protection, a concept
introduced by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) that an individual can incur a cost to reduce the
probability of loss while leaving the magnitude of loss unchanged. We show that under
some natural assumptions, the monopoly market with endogeneity is less risky since a
monopolist internalizes the externality, while the competitive market with endogeneity is
inefficient because the average level of risk is too high.
Interdependence of risks is best exemplified by automobile insurance. In the presence
of moral hazard, a driver’s coverage affects her level of self-protection, which will affect
the ambient level of risk and indirectly influence another driver’s choice of accident prob-
ability. If a lower coverage causes one driver to drive with more precaution, then another
driver will be exposed to a safer driving environment. As a result, she will put less ef-
fort into driving. Interdependence of risks is highly relevant to the real world, yet most
existing literature abstracts from this endogeneity – to our knowledge, there is limited
literature that focuses on the interaction between adverse selection and across-contract
endogeneity of risks. Hofmann (2007) is the only closely related paper; she shows that a
monopolist can achieve a socially optimal level of risk within a context of limited expected
profits of the monopolist, compulsory insurance and a binary decision of self-protection.
We first investigate the optimal contracts designed by a monopolist facing two types
of individuals, who only differ in the cost of self-protection, in a market without across-
contract endogeneity. Both separating and pooling equilibria are found to be possible.
In solving the monopolist’s profit maximization problem with across-contract endogene-
ity, we adopt techniques from Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Chen and Rothschild
(2015) – we decompose the optimization problem into an inner problem, which chooses
the optimal contracts to maximize profits given a fixed level of average risk, and an outer
4
problem, which picks the profit-maximizing level of average risk in the market. By ex-
amining the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian of the inner and outer problem, we
characterize the distortions on the equilibrium contracts caused by across-contract endo-
geneity. Under certain conditions, the monopolist will offer contracts that create a less
risky environment relative to the market without across-contract endogeneity.
In the analysis of the competitive market without across-agent endogeneity, we find
that both pooling and separating contracts are possible in the equilibrium. We show the
competitive market to be inefficient when across-contract endogeneity is introduced to
the market – the average risk level is too high as there exists a feasible allocation that
makes both types better off if the average risk is lowered.
The results are suggestive of a trade-off between monopoly and perfect competition.
A monopolist generally extracts rents due to her market power; our model implies that
the competitive market is inefficient because of insurers’ failure to take across-contract
externality into account. Recall that under moral hazard, agents are offered partial
coverage due to incentive problems. Moral hazard can be viewed as the first source
of endogeneity in our model and across-contract endogeneity is the second. The latter
further reduces the optimal insurance coverage in a monopoly market relative to the level
of coverage in a monopoly market with only moral hazard. Nevertheless, competitive
insurers do not consider the second type of endogeneity and offer contracts that induce
an unnecessarily high level of average risk. Due to excessive insurance, the competitive
market outcome is not constrained Pareto efficient.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model, the equi-
librium concepts considered in each market and the assumptions that we make in our
analysis. Section 3 presents our analysis of the optimal contracts in a monopoly and
competitive market, with and without across-contract endogeneity respectively. Section
4 discusses the implications of the results and concludes.
2 Setup
2.1 The Model
There are two types of individuals in the insurance market, low-risk types (denoted
L) and high-risk types (denoted H), and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of L types in the mar-
ket. The individuals have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences with expected utility
function u(x). We assume that u′(x) > 0 and u′′(x) < 0.
Each type of individual has wealth W and suffers from a potential loss D with prob-
ability p, where p depends on the individual’s efforts for self-protection, introduced by
Ehrlich and Becker (1972).1 Such efforts are costly and also dependent on type and the
1Note that Ehrlich and Becker consider the cost of self-protection in terms of additional expenditure
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ambient level of risk – the individual will incur a cost of h(p, p¯, ki), where ki is the type-
specific parameter, to maintain her personal risk at p when the average risk in the market












> 0 and ∂
2h
∂p∂k
< 0.2 In our
analysis, we will suppress the argument ki and write h(p, p¯, ki) as hi(p, p¯).
Insurance contracts are characterized by a non-negative premium R and a non-
negative indemnity I ≤ D. Equivalently, we can describe a contract by the consump-
tions in loss and no loss states, cL and cNL respectively, which satisfy cNL ≤ W and
cL ≥ W −D. Graphically, the insurance contract lies to the northwest of the endowment
point (W,W − D) in the (cNL, cL) space. We assume that people always want to buy
insurance.
Given a contract (cNL, cL), if a type-i agent chooses a risk level pi, she will get an
expected utility of
Eui(cNL, cL; p¯) = piu(cL) + (1− pi)u(cNL)− hi(pi, p¯).
Define the indirect utility of type i to be
U i(cNL, cL; p¯) ≡ max
pi
piu(cL) + (1− pi)u(cNL)− hi(pi, p¯)
and the maximizer to be
p∗i (cNL, cL; p¯) = argmax
pi
Eui(cNL, cL; p¯).
The insurer can observe neither the personal risk p∗i nor the type i.
2.2 Equilibrium Concepts
The only nonstandard element in our model is the average risk in the market p¯ =
λpL+(1−λ)pH , which we assume to capture the across-contract endogeneity by including
p¯ in the indirect utility function and cost function as an argument. In a market with
across-contract endogeneity, an insurance contract has an externality – the insurance
coverage will influence one’s risk level due to moral hazard and in turn the ambient level
of risk, which has an effect on other individuals’ choice of personal risk.
Towards studying the optimal contracts in a monopoly or competitive insurance mar-
ket with across-contract endogeneity, it is helpful to look at markets without endogeneity.
throughout both states whereas in our model, self-protection induces a utility cost but does not reduce
wealth in either state.
2The derivative ∂
2h
∂p¯∂p < 0 means that the cost to reduce risk at the margin is higher when p¯ is higher.
This ensures that if p¯ increases, the risk level pi chosen by an individual will increase for a given contract.
The derivative ∂
2h
∂p∂k < 0 implies that H types bear higher costs at the margin to reduce their risks and
therefore the high-risk types always choose higher risks than low-risk types at any point.
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In this section, we discuss the different equilibrium concepts considered under different
market structures. Without across-contract endogeneity, the ambient level of risk p¯ is
thought of as fixed by both the insurer(s) and individuals. Thus p¯ can be treated as an
exogenous parameter and for notational convenience we will suppress the argument in the
functions and quantities dependent on p¯. However, in the presence of such endogeneity,
we will take p¯ into account and consider an additional consistency constraint in solving
the problem.
2.2.1 Monopoly Market without Endogeneity
The monopolist wishes to maximize her total profit pi = λpiL+(1−λ)piH from offering
insurance to both types, where pii(cNL, cL) = −p∗i (cNL, cL)cL−(1−p∗i (cNL, cL))cNL+W−
p∗i (cNL, cL)D is the profit from selling a contract to type i. Each type’s contract should
provide a utility no less than the type’s outside option. The monopolist cannot observe an
individual’s type i or risk p∗i . By the revelation principle (Myerson 1979), we can think of







L ) subject to type-specific individual rationality constraints and
incentive compatibility constraints. Hence, the monopoly’s profit maximization problem













L) + (1− λ)piH(cHNL, cHL ) (1)
subject to UL(cLNL, c
L
L) ≥ U¯L (IRL)
UH(cHNL, c
H
L ) ≥ U¯H (IRH)
UL(cLNL, c
L
L) ≥ UL(cHNL, cHL ) (ICL)
UH(cHNL, c
H
L ) ≥ UH(cLNL, cLL), (ICH)
where U¯ i = U i(W,W −D).
Although the problem is framed as, without loss of generality, “choosing” contracts
for both types, we do not impose an additional restriction that all types must purchase
insurance. Indeed, the contract (W,W −D) corresponds to the endowment point where
an agent does not purchase any insurance.
Specifically, (IRL) and (IRH) are the individual rationality constraints of the L type
and the H type respectively. For a type-i agent to accept the type i’s contract (ciNL, c
i
L),
she has to obtain a minimum utility of U¯ i, the utility that she will get without purchasing
insurance. These two constraints ensure the participation of both types in the market.
(ICL) and (ICH) are the incentive compatibility constraints of the L type and the H
type respectively. By accepting the type i’s contract, a type-i agent will be no worse off
than buying the type j’s contract. Therefore, each type has no incentive to mimic the
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other type and deviate from her own type’s contract.
2.2.2 Monopoly Market with Endogeneity
When across-agent endogeneity is present, in maximizing her profits, the monopolist
recognizes the externality of the contract offered to one individual on others’ cost of
reducing personal risk, and thus she will take the endogeneity into account when designing
the contracts. In the profit maximization problem, she chooses p¯ in addition to theH-type
and L-type contracts, subject to the participation constraints, incentive compatibility
constraints and an additional consistency constraint, which ensures the average risk level
induced by the contracts chosen to be consistent with p¯. The profit maximization problem















L; p¯) + (1− λ)piH(cHNL, cHL ; p¯) (2)
subject to UL(cLNL, c
L
L; p¯) ≥ UL(W,W −D; p¯) (IRL)
UH(cHNL, c
H
L ; p¯) ≥ UH(W,W −D; p¯) (IRH)
UL(cLNL, c
L
L; p¯) ≥ UL(cHNL, cHL ; p¯) (ICL)
UH(cHNL, c
H





L; p¯) + (1− λ)p∗H(cHNL, cHL ; p¯) = p¯. (Consistency)
As in the monopoly’s problem without endogeneity, (IRL) and (IRH) are the participa-
tion constraints of the L type and the H type respectively, while (ICL) and (ICH) are
the incentive compatibility constraints of the L type and the H type respectively. Note
that each type’s outside option, indirect utility function and profit function all depend
on p¯ due to across-contract endogeneity.
2.2.3 Competitive Market without Endogeneity
In the case of a competitive market, we consider the Miyazaki(1977)-Wilson(1977)-
Spence(1978) (MWS) equilibrium concept. The insurers will “design” incentive compat-
ible contracts to maximize the L type’s utility while offering the H type a contract that
gives at least their first-best utility and making an overall zero profit. Under MWS con-
tracts, it is possible to observe cross-subsidization from the L type to the H type – in
contrast to the Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts, which require each individual contract to
yield zero profit, MWS contracts only require the insurer to make an overall zero profit.
8












subject to UH(cHNL, c
H
L ; p¯) ≥ U˜H(p¯) (3.MUH)
UH(cHNL, c
H
L ; p¯) ≥ UH(cLNL, cLL; p¯) (3.ICH)
UL(cLNL, c
L





L; p¯) + (1− λ)piH(cHNL, cHL ; p¯) = 0, (3.Zero profit)












L ; p¯) = 0.
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Recall that p¯ is exogenous in this case. (3.MUH) is the participation constraint of H
types. The H-type contract must yield a utility no less than the first-best utility of H
types; otherwise, they can reveal their type to the insurer and purchase their first-best
contract. (3.ICL) and (3.ICH) are the usual incentive compatibility constraints to ensure
that each type self-selects into her own type’s contract. The zero-profit constraint requires
the insurer to break even.
It is worth noting that in principle the first-best allocations for both types may be
achieved – Bond and Crocker (1991) find that it is possible to have first-best outcomes in
a market under adverse selection and moral hazard. Since we are primarily interested in
studying the distortions on contracts caused by informational asymmetry, we will restrict
our attention to the class of problems in which (3.ICH) must bind and thus first-best
outcome is not attainable.
2.2.4 Competitive Market with Endogeneity
As discussed at the beginning of this section, the contracts offered will affect p¯ and
an individual’s risk level under across-contract endogeneity, and hence each individual’s
utility and profit. Nevertheless, since each insurer has only a small share in the com-
petitive market, she will disregard the externality of the contracts offered on the average
level of risk in the market. As a result, each insurer will take p¯ as fixed and offer MWS
contracts with respect to this p¯. The MWS contracts will pin down p¯ by a fixed point
condition.
Formally, MWS contracts with endogenous risk are (~cH∗,~cL∗, p¯) such that ~cH∗ =
3The problem is first-best if we view the indirect utility function U i and profit function pii involving
the endogenous pi as “fundamental”. We provide a more detailed discussion of the use of language of




L ) and ~c
L∗ = (cL∗NL, c
L∗






L ; p¯) +






subject to UH(~cH ; p¯) ≥ U˜H(p¯) (4.MUH)
UH(~cH ; p¯) ≥ UH(~cL; p¯) (4.ICH)
UL(~cL; p¯) ≥ UL(~cH ; p¯) (4.ICL)
λpiL(~c












L ; p¯) = p¯
}
. (4.Consistency)
The consistency constraint can be viewed as a fixed point condition that the alloca-
tion must satisfy. Note that the indirect utility function, the H type’s first-best utility
and the profit function all depend on p¯ due to across-contract endogeneity. Since every
competitive insurer treats p¯ as exogenous, p¯ is not a choice variable as in the monopoly’s
endogenous problem.
2.3 Assumptions
As an individual’s risk level p is endogenous, indifference curves and iso-profit curves
are not as analytically clean as in a standard insurance market a la Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) with pure adverse selection. Additional structure is therefore needed to facilitate
the analysis.
Before stating our assumptions, it is useful to consider the one-agent first-best problem










subject to U i(ciNL, c
i
L) ≥ U¯ i
′ ≡ U i +R, (IRi(R))
where R is the utility rent of type i.4 It is straightforward to show that (IRi(R)) must
bind in the solution to (5). Thus the problem is equivalent to one that maximizes profits
by choosing the profit-maximizing contract on a given indifference curve (U¯ i +R). Since
indifference curves are downward sloping, we can parametrize the indifference curve as-
sociated with a given level of rent R via ciNL.
4We would like to stress again that the problem is first-best from the point of view of a market with
moral hazard.
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Denote the profit function restricted on type i’s indifference curve with rent R by
piRi (cNL) ≡ pii(cNL, c˜L(cNL;R))
where c˜L(cNL;R) is the solution to U
i(cNL, cL) = U¯
i +R




















Assuming the solution to the first-best problem (5) is unique for each R, the corre-
spondence ci(R) is single-valued for each R. By the Theorem of the Maximum, it is a
continuous function and we will denote it as ~ci(R).
The dual of the problem (5) can be thought of as maximizing an individual’s utility
subject to a generalized “budget constraint”. As the individual has a higher “budget”, it
is not unreasonable for her to consume more of both goods, i.e., we expect consumptions
in both loss and no loss states to be normal goods. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 1. (Well-behavedness) The first-best problem (5) for type i is well-behaved
if piRi (c
i
NL) is single-peaked for any R and
~ci(R) increases monotonically in both cNL and
cL with R.
The following assumption ensures that the comparative statics of the contracts is
well-behaved.
Assumption 1. The first-best problem (5) for the L and H type is well-behaved.
For the moment, we treat Assumption 1 as a “high-level” assumption. But (a) we
have verified that it holds, in practice, for a wide range of natural specifications, and (b)
it is straightforward to provide sufficient conditions on fundamentals which ensure that
it holds.5
In addition, we will impose a certain structure on the cost function hi(p, p¯). It is
useful to first define the compensated elasticity in the following manner.







be the compensated elas-
ticity of p with respect to p¯ holding h(p, p¯) constant.
Note that the compensated elasticity is a function of the contract. A particular
convenient class of h functions for analysis is the set of functions h(p, p¯) that solely
depends on the ratio between powers of p and p¯, i.e., h(p, p¯) = hˆ(p
α
p¯
) for some α 6= 0.
































, we know that the
elasticity is independent of contract. In fact, this class belongs to a more general class of
functions that exhibits a consistent ordering of compensated elasticity between the two
types, in particular
∣∣ηHp,p¯∣∣ ≤ ∣∣ηLp,p¯∣∣ at any given point. Our results go through in the more
general ordering of compensated elasticity.
3 Analysis
3.1 Monopoly Market without Endogeneity
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the monopoly’s problem with-
out endogeneity.
Proposition 1. There exists λ and λ¯ such that
1. If 0 ≤ λ < λ, the optimal L-type contract is the endowment (W,W − D), and
the optimal H-type contract is the first-best contract with R = 0.6 The solution is
unique.
2. If λ < λ < λ¯, the H-type contract is first-best with R > 0 and the L-type contract
provides positive insurance and zero utility rents.7






L ) and H types earn positive rents R > 0. The
solution is unique.8
Figure 1: 0 ≤ λ < λ Figure 2: λ < λ < λ¯ Figure 3: λ > λ¯
To gain intuition on the solution, we first illustrate the three regimes in Proposition
1 graphically.
6Again, the contract is first-best in the sense that we take U i and pii, which are derived from consid-
ering the endogeneity of p due to moral hazard, as fundamentals.
7When λ = λ, the L-type contract being the endowment (W,W−D) and the optimal H-type contract
being the first-best contract with R = 0 are optimal. However, it is possible for contracts of the form
stated in (2) to be optimal.
8When λ = λ¯, the solution can be of the form stated in (2) or (3).
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Figure 1 shows the optimal contracts for sufficiently low values of λ. To earn profits
on L types, the monopolist needs to give rents to H types. Since there are too few
L types in the market, the monopolist prefers to forgo profits on L types and extract
maximal profits from H types instead. Under such circumstances, H types will purchase
their first-best contract while L types do not purchase any insurance at all. Figure 2
illustrates the optimal contracts when λ exceeds λ. As the fraction of L types rises, the
monopolist eventually finds it desirable to give positive rents to H types in order to sell
profitable contracts to L types.
As λ rises, the monopolist gives higher and higher rents to H types, and the optimal
L-type contract moves up and to the left along the L type’s indifference curve through the
endowment point. It is possible that, when these rents get sufficiently high, the first-best
H-type contract for the required level of rent lies to the right of this L type’s indifference
curve, as depicted in Figure 3. As this would fail to be incentive compatible, pooling the
H-type contract with the L-type contract maximizes profit. In the limit as λ → 1, it
becomes optimal to offer L types their first-best zero-rent contract.
We will prove the proposition in three steps. In the first step, we simplify the set
of constraints of the problem (1). In the second step, we introduce a new variable R to
decompose the problem into an outer and inner problem and solve the inner problem.
In the third step, we solve the outer problem and fully characterize the solution to the
original profit maximization problem. The technical details of the proof are relegated to
the Appendix, but we provide the intuition here.










pi = λpiL + (1− λ)piH (6)










cHNL ≤ cLNL. (Monotonicity)
This equivalence holds for basically standard reasons: the constraint (IRH) is redundant;
the constraints (IRL) and (ICH) must bind, and the single crossing property, which is
proved in Lemma 6 in the Appendix, implies that (ICL) can be replaced with a mono-
tonicity constraint much as in Mirrlees (1971).
Step 2: Since (ICH) binds in the solution, it is natural to introduce a new variable













λpiL + (1− λ)piH (7)










cHNL ≤ cLNL (monotonicity)
UH = U¯H +R. (R¯)
The inner problem, which we denote asALT (R), pins down the set of profit-maximizing
contracts that satisfy (IRL), (ICH), monotonicity and an additional constraint (R¯). (R¯)
specifies the utility of H types in the solution to be U¯H + R. The outer problem is to
choose R to maximize profits. It is clear that the solution to problem (6) is a solution
to the combined inner and outer problem (7). Once the problem is decomposed, we can
solve the inner problem and study how the contracts offered vary with R.
Step 3: We examine the outer problem and study the comparative statics of R with
respect to λ. We define pii(R) to be the profits from type i in the solution to ALT (R)
when the rent given to H types equals R. The outer problem can be written as
max
R
pi(R, λ) = λpiL(R) + (1− λ)piH(R).
By showing that the total profit has increasing differences in (R, λ), we can apply Topkis’s
Theorem to relate R∗, the optimal value of rents, with λ, the fraction of L types in the
market. In particular, Topkis’s Theorem implies that the set of optimal rents is non-
decreasing in λ in the strong set order. Therefore, the well-behaved comparative statics
of the optimal contracts with respect toR can be translated to a well-behaved comparative
statics of the optimal contracts with respect to λ as claimed in the proposition.
Figure 4 shows how the optimal rent varies with λ if the solution to the outer problem
for each λ is unique and λ¯ ≤ 1.9 A low value of λ corresponds to a low value of rents,
and thus only H types will purchase insurance in the solution. A higher λ will result in
an H-type first-best contract with positive rents and an L-type contract with zero rents.
If λ¯ ≤ 1, a sufficiently high λ will result in a pooling contract.
3.2 Monopoly Market with Endogeneity
So far, we have characterized the solution to the monopoly’s exogenous problem. Now
we introduce across-contract endogeneity and study how it will distort the contracts of
9Although there are nice monotone comparative statics, the profit function pi(R, λ) is not necessarily
differentiable. It is theoretically possible that some values of rents are not optimal for any λ and there
will be “gaps” in the graph of the optimal rent correspondence.
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Figure 4: Relationship between R∗ and λ
both types. We do so in three steps: (1) simplify the set of constraints, (2) study the sign
of the Lagrange multiplier on the consistency constraint and (3) look at how contracts
are distorted with respect to the optimal contracts without endogeneity.















L; p¯) + (1− λ)piH(cHNL, cHL ; p¯) (8)
subject to UL(cLNL, c
L
L; p¯) = U
L(W,W −D; p¯) (IRL)
UH(cHNL, c
H









L; p¯) + (1− λ)p∗H(cHNL, cHL ; p¯) = p¯. (Consistency)
In other words, (IRH) is redundant, (IRL) and (ICH) must bind in the solution and
(ICL) can be replaced by monotonicity. The proof is similar in spirit to the one in the
monopoly’s exogenous problem. Note that the only difference is that we ought to consider
movements of contracts that keep the ambient level of risk constant, e.g., a movement of
contract along the iso-probability line.
For the simplified optimization problem, the Lagrangian can be expressed as



























Figure 5: Possible distortions on an undistorted contract
where α, β, γ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers on (IRL), (ICH), the monotonicity
constraint and the consistency constraint respectively.
Step 2: Now that we have defined the Lagrangian for the problem, it will be useful
to determine the sign of µ, which has implications on the optimal average level of risk
in the market. A positive sign signifies that in the absence of the consistency constraint,
the monopolist would have chosen contracts that yield a lower p¯ to improve her profits,
and vice versa. The sign also tells us the direction of distortion on each type’s contract
under across-contract endogeneity.
We first look at the one-agent profit maximization problem to gain insight into the
sign of the multiplier. When only one type is present, the incentive compatibility and





pi(cNL, cL; p¯) (10)
subject to U(cNL, cL; p¯) = U(W,W −D; p¯) (IR)
p∗(cNL, cL; p¯) = p¯ (Consistency)
and the corresponding Lagrangian is
L(cNL, cL, p¯) = pi(cNL, cL; p¯) + α (U(cNL, cL; p¯)− U(W,W −D; p¯))
+µ (p∗(cNL, cL; p¯)− p¯) .
We define the following terms to describe possible distortions, which are easily visu-
alized as in Figure 5.
Definition 3. (Distortions) A contract (cNL, cL) is undistorted if the indifference
16
curve is tangent to the iso-profit curve at (cNL, cL). It is distorted upward if the indif-
ference curve is steeper than the iso-profit curve at (cNL, cL). It is distorted downward
if the indifference curve is less steep than the iso-profit curve at (cNL, cL).
The following lemma summarizes the direction of distortion by looking at the impli-
cation of the sign of µ on profits for a small local movement of the contract.
Lemma 1. In a one-type problem, the optimal contract is distorted upward if µ is positive
and distorted downward if µ is negative.
Proof. See Appendix Section C.
When µ is positive, a small movement of the contract along the indifference curve
towards the endowment point holding p¯ constant will increase profits. This implies that
the contract offered involves more insurance relative to the undistorted contract. On the
contrary, when µ is negative, a small movement of the contract along the indifference curve
away from the endowment point holding p¯ constant will increase profits. This implies
that the contract offered involves less insurance relative to the undistorted contract.
It is not hard to find an example in which µ can take either a positive or a negative sign.
We consider a one-type case and choose the following functional forms and parameters:
u(x) = − 1
2x2
, h(p, p¯) = 1
100(1−p¯)3(1+p)3 , W = 4 and D = 2.
10
Figure 6 shows the indifference curves that pass through the endowment when p¯1 = 0.3
(the pink line) and p¯2 = 0.6 (the blue line). On each of the indifference curves, the red
square marker indicates the contract (cNL, cL) where the consistency constraint binds, i.e.,
p∗(cNL, cL; p¯) = p¯, while the black circle marker indicates the contract that maximizes the
profits for a fixed p¯, i.e., maximizes profit while only satisfying the individual rationality
constraint but not necessarily the consistency constraint.
On the indifference curve with p¯1 = 0.3, the profit-maximizing contract lies to the
right of the consistency-constraint contract – moving the contract from the consistency-
constraint contract along the indifference curve to the right holding p¯1 constant will
increase profits. Thus the optimal contract is distorted upward. By Lemma 1, µ is
positive. On the contrary, when p¯2 = 0.6, the profit-maximizing contract lies to the
left of the consistency-constraint contract – moving the contract from the consistency-
constraint contract along the indifference curve to the left holding p¯2 constant will increase
profits. Thus the optimal contract is distorted downward. By Lemma 1, µ is negative.
The above example demonstrates that it is possible for µ to be positive or negative
in a one-agent profit maximization problem. Therefore, in step 3, when we analyze how
contracts are distorted by the across-contract endogeneity, we will consider both cases:
(1) µ is positive and (2) µ is negative.
10This particular functional form for h may yield negative p or large p > 1 when we solve the first-order
condition for utility maximization. It is possible to patch the h function for extreme values of p in a way
that has no effect on the equilibrium.
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Figure 6: An one-agent example
Step 3: To study how each type’s contract is distorted, we divide our analysis into
two parts: separating contracts and pooling contracts.
It is worth noting that both moral hazard and across-contract endogeneity are present
in the model. The undistorted contract per Definition 3 is first-best if we view the indirect
utility function and the profit function derived from taking the endogenous p response
into account as “fundamental”. However, from the viewpoint of a market with pure
adverse selection, the undistorted contract is second-best, because individuals only pur-
chase insurance with partial coverage due to moral hazard.11 Across-contract endogeneity
further distorts the second-best contract so an optimal contract in a market with interde-
pendence of risks can be viewed as third-best. To state the distortions we are examining
precisely and avoid the confusing language of first-, second- and third-best, we give the
following definitions.
Definition 4. (Distortions on a pooling contract) Consider a pooling contract
(cNL, cL). Then the pooling contract is p-distorted upward if the L type’s indifference
curve is steeper than the pooled iso-profit curve at (cNL, cL); it is p-distorted downward
if the L type’s indifference curve is less steep than the pooled iso-profit curve at (cNL, cL).
Figure 7 illustrates the distortions on a pooling contract. The distortions on a pooling
contract are similar to those on an undistorted contract in the sense that both are defined
in terms of the relative steepness of the slopes of an indifference curve and an iso-profit
curve. However, we consider the pooled iso-profit curve, instead of a particular type’s
11The undistorted contract is also not first-best with endogenous contracts because of the externality.
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Figure 7: Possible distortions on a pooling contract
iso-profit curve, for distortions on a pooling contract, since such distortions will influence
the profits from both types.
For separating contracts, H types are informationally unconstrained so the distortions
on the H-type contract are analogous to the ones on an undistorted contract. Yet, it is
trickier to define distortions on the L type’s contract due to the binding of (ICH). A
movement of the L type’s contract must be accompanied by an incentive compatible
movement of the H type’s contract. Therefore, distortions on the L type’s contract are
defined by joint movements of both type’s contracts.
Definition 5. (Distortions on separating contracts) Consider separating contracts
(cHNL, c
H




L) that satisfy (ICH). The H-type contract is s-distorted upward
if the H-type contract is distorted upward; it is s-distorted downward if the H-type
contract is distorted downward. The L-type contract is s-distorted upward if moving
the H-type contract down along the iso-probability line to the left and L-type contract
down along the L type’s indifference curve to the right, fixing p¯ and maintaining (ICH),
increases profits; it is s-distorted downward if moving the H-type contract up along
the iso-probability line to the right and L-type contract up along the L type’s indifference
curve to the left, fixing p¯ and maintaining (ICH), increases profits.
An s-upward distorted and an s-downward distorted L-type contract are depicted in
Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.
Intuitively, if p¯ is the optimal level of average risk in the endogenous problem, the solu-
tion to the exogenous problem associated with p¯ will not be a solution to the endogenous
problem – the optimal endogenous contracts are distorted because of the addition of the
consistency constraint. The sign of µ, which can be viewed as the “penalty” for violating
the consistency constraint, suggests the directions in which the monopoly insurer will
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Figure 8: An s-upward distorted
L-type contract
Figure 9: An s-downward distorted
L-type contract
distort the contracts. By considering the directional derivative of the Lagrangian in par-
ticular directions, we can determine what those distortions are. The following proposition
specifies the distortions on the optimal contracts.
Proposition 2. Suppose µ is positive. If the optimal contracts are identical (i.e., pooling
contract), then the pooling contract is p-distorted upward; if the optimal contracts are dis-
tinct (i.e., separating contract), then both H type’s and L type’s contracts are s-distorted
upward.
Suppose µ is negative. If the optimal contracts are identical (i.e., pooling contract),
then the pooling contract is p-distorted downward; if the optimal contracts are distinct
(i.e., separating contract), then both H type’s and L type’s contracts are s-distorted down-
ward.
Proof. See Appendix Section D.
Proposition 2 establishes the directions of distortions on the optimal contracts with
endogeneity. As we have discussed, a positive µ encourages the monopolist to choose
a higher level of average risk in the market – individuals are likely to purchase more
insurance when the market is riskier and hence the monopolist can profit from selling
more insurance. A negative µ leads to a lower level of average risk in the market – in
a less risky environment, both types are better off and the monopolist can extract more
profits from the individuals. In principle, both cases are possible, but we argue that
the negative case may be more relevant, as lower risk is often deemed better and it is
less likely that insurers would attempt to raise profits by deliberately creating a riskier
environment.
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3.3 Competitive Market without Endogeneity
As in the monopoly’s case, (3.ICL) can be replaced by the monotonicity constraint.
The arguments are essentially identical so we omit them here.
To characterize what the optimal contracts in a competitive market without across-
contract endogeneity are, we first pin down the set of possible candidates. We note that
because (3.ICH) binds in the solution, a natural way to proceed is to parametrize the
set of candidate allocations by values of UH . For a given λ, define the pooled zero-profit
curve as the set of contracts (cNL, cL) such that pooling the contract yields zero profit,
i.e., λpiL(cNL, cL) + (1− λ)piH(cNL, cL) = 0.
For a given UH ≥ U˜H that is feasible , one possible candidate is the pooling zero-profit
contract, which is located at the intersection between the pooled zero-profit curve and
the H type’s indifference curve UH . It is clear that a pooling zero-profit contract satisfies
(3.MUH), (3.ICH) and monotonicity, and we will characterize the condition under which
the pooling zero-profit contract maximizes the L type’s utility for feasible values of UH .12
Lemma 2. For a feasible level of UH , the associated pooling zero-profit contract will be
the UL-maximizing allocation if and only if moving the H-type contract from the pooling
zero-profit contract to the left along the H type’s indifference curve does not yield higher
profits from H types.
Proof. See Appendix Section E.
The idea behind the lemma is straightforward. There are essentially two cases: (1)
the H type’s profit-maximizing contract lies on the left of the pooling zero-profit contract
and (2) the H type’s profit-maximizing contract lies on or to the right of the pooling zero-
profit contract, illustrated by Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively. Case (1) implies that
we can find another contract on the H type’s indifference curve that yields higher profits
from H types than the pooling zero-profit contract without violating the monotonicity
constraint, and therefore the corresponding UL-maximizing contract is one on the same
H type’s indifference curve that yields a profit of − (1−λ)piH
λ
(for λ 6= 0). No such H type’s
contract can be found in case (2), and thus the pooling zero-profit contract maximizes
UL.
So far we have looked at the candidate allocation for each feasible UH , and it is useful
to group these allocations together for characterizing the MWS contracts. Define the
L-type contract locus to be the set of UL-maximizing L-type contracts for values of UH
where moving the H-type contract to the left of the pooling zero-profit contract along the
H type’s indifference curve raises profit. Moreover, define the L-type candidate allocation
12Feasibility of UH has a geometrical interpretation – for an infeasible value of UH , the associated H
type’s indifference curve will not intersect the pooled zero-profit curve. With the assumption of single-
peakedness of profit along an indifference curve and the single crossing property, there are no feasible
allocations when all the contracts on the H type’s indifference curve, if pooled, yield negative profits.
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Figure 10: Pooled zero-profit contract
does not maximize UL
Figure 11: Pooling zero-profit contract
maximizes UL
Figure 12: The L-type candidate allocation curve
curve to be the union of the L-type contract locus and the portion of the pooled zero-
profit curve above its intersection with the H-type profit maximization curve (i.e., the
part of pooled zero-profit curve associated with UH where the pooling zero-profit contract
maximizes UL). Figure 12 illustrates the L-type contract locus and the L-type candidate
allocation curve.
As we have identified the candidates for the MWS L-type contract, we are ready to
characterize the solution per the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let (cHNL, c
H




L) be the optimal MWS contracts for H types and
L types respectively. Let UH = UH(cLNL, c
L
L). The MWS equilibrium L-type contract is
the UL-maximizing contract on the L-type candidate allocation curve while the H-type
contract is the profit-maximizing contract associated with UH subject to monotonicity.
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Proof. Let (cNL, cL) be the pooling zero-profit contract on the indifference curve U
H . If




L) lies on the L-type contract locus as defined above. If profits from H types do not
increase from (cNL, cL) to the left, then the U
L-maximizing contract contract (cLNL, c
L
L)
is simply the pooling zero-profit contract (cNL, cL). Under both cases, the L-type MWS
contract lies on the L-type candidate allocation curve. The optimality of the contract
implies that it must the one that maximizes UL among all the contracts on the L-type
candidate allocation curve. The location of the H-type contract follows from the proof
of Lemma 2 and it maximizes profits from H types subject to monotonicity.
We provide two examples below to demonstrate that the optimal MWS contracts
can be separating or pooling. We use the following functional forms: u(x) = − 1
2x2
and
h(p, p¯) = k
100(1−p¯)3(1+p)3 , with p¯ = 0.3.
In the first example, we choose the following set of parameters: λ = 0.7, W = 4, D = 2,
kL = 1 and kH = 3. A separating equilibrium is observed and illustrated in Figure 13.
The H-type and L-type contracts are distinct – the former lies on the H-type profit
maximization curve while the latter lies on the L-type contract locus.
In the second example we choose the following set of parameters: λ = 0.9, W =
5, D = 3, kL = 1 and kH = 4. A pooling equilibrium is observed and and illustrated in
Figure 14. Notice that the profit maximization point, marked by the intersection of the
light blue H-type profit maximization curve and the dark blue H-type indifference curve,
lies on the right of the pooling zero-profit contract.
3.4 Competitive Market with Endogeneity
Competitive insurers do not internalize the externality of insurance contracts – the
small market share prompts each insurer to take the average market risk as fixed instead
of endogenous. Thus the contracts offered are the optimal contracts in the exogenous
problem associated with a certain p¯ and satisfy the consistency constraint as a fixed
point condition. Therefore, we would expect the competitive insurers to choose contracts
that induce an average risk level p¯ higher than necessary.
The expectation is actually true. We show that the MWS contracts with endogeneity
are inefficient in two steps. First, we consider a family of problems that differ in the
exogenous levels of p¯ and show that a parametric lowering of p¯ implies that the constrained
Pareto frontier is strictly further out. Second, we show that the MWS endogenous
allocation is constrained Pareto inefficient. At an MWS endogenous allocation, moving
the H-type contract in an incentive compatible way has no effects from the viewpoint of
the insurers because such a movement does not affect profit. However, a notional social
planner will recognize the positive welfare effect of the movement via the consistency
constraint. A lower p¯ shifts the Pareto frontier out by step 1 and both types will be
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Figure 13: A numerical example of separating contracts
Figure 14: A numerical example of pooling contract
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Figure 15: The movement of the Constrained Pareto frontier when p¯ decreases
better off.
In the first step, it is helpful to consider the following program:
F (p¯, U˜H) ≡ max
~cH ,~cL
UL(~cL; p¯)
subject to UH(~cH ; p¯) ≥ U˜H (MU ′H)
(3.ICH), (Monotonicity) and (3.Zero profit).
The program F and the MWS exogenous program differ only in the participation con-
straint of H types – the outside option is fixed in (MU ′H) while it is dependent on p¯ in
(3.MUH). Indeed the MWS exogenous program is a special case of the program F . Note
that the program F does not consider the consistency constraint.
The following lemma establishes that if we can reduce p¯ at any allocation parametri-
cally, then both types will be better off. The result relies on the assumption about the
global structure of the h function, that the difference between ηp,p¯ at a point between the
two types is weakly monotonic, and in particular
∣∣ηHp,p¯∣∣ ≤ ∣∣ηLp,p¯∣∣ at a point.
Lemma 4. The constrained Pareto frontier of the program F is ordered by p¯; in partic-
ular, any constrained optimal allocation associated with p¯ is dominated by some feasible
outcomes with p¯′ when p¯′ < p¯.
Proof. See Appendix Section F.
In other words, the Pareto frontier will be “pushed out”, as depicted in Figure 15, if we
can reduce p¯ parametrically. Of course, we cannot freely do so because of the consistency
constraint. If we can ignore the consistency constraint though, Lemma 4 implies that we
will be able to get a Pareto improvement. We will show that we can ignore the consistency
constraint at the margin starting from an MWS endogenous allocation.
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Definition 6. (Constrained Pareto efficiency) An allocation (~cH∗,~cL∗, p¯∗) satisfies







subject to UH(~cH ; p¯) ≥ U˜H (MU ′H)
(4.ICH), (Monotonicity), (4.Zero profit) and (4.Consistency).
Define G to be the inner program, i.e.,
G(p¯, U˜H) ≡ max
~cH ,~cL
UL(~cL; p¯)
subject to UH(~cH ; p¯) ≥ U˜H (MU ′H)
(3.ICH), (Monotonicity), (3.zero profit) and (4.Consistency).
A necessary condition for constrained Pareto efficiency at p¯∗ is that G(p¯∗, U˜H) reaches a
local maximum at p¯ = p¯∗.
We adopt the techniques from Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) and Chen and Roth-
schild (2015) in this step. Notice that the program G is the inner problem of (11) while
the outer problem is to choose p¯ to maximize UL. The presence of the consistency con-
straint in the program G implies that we cannot parametrically reduce p¯ – it is not only
a parameter because of the extra constraint.
If we can show that the multiplier on the consistency constraint is zero at an MWS
endogenous allocation, then the program G coincides with F locally. By the previous
lemma, the value of F decreases with p¯, implying that the value of G also decreases with p¯.
Therefore, the MWS endogenous allocation cannot solve the problem (11). We note that
the program G differs from F by the consistency constraint, so the value of G should be
no greater than that of F given any pair of (p¯, U˜H). By definition, the endogenous MWS
allocation associated with p¯MWS satisfies the consistency constraint and is a solution to
the program F with (p¯MWS, U˜
H(p¯MWS)). Then we must have F (p¯MWS, U˜
H(p¯MWS)) =
G(p¯MWS, U˜
H(p¯MWS)). From the point of view of F , adding in a consistency constraint
has no effect, so the multiplier should equal zero. The proposition below formalizes the
intuition.
Proposition 3. The MWS endogenous allocation is not constrained Pareto efficient
in a competitive market with endogeneity – there exists a feasible allocation that Pareto
dominates the MWS endogenous allocation.
Proof. See Appendix Section G.
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We have demonstrated that the MWS endogenous allocations in a competitive market
with endogeneity is inefficient precisely because there exists a feasible allocation that
makes both types better off than the MWS endogenous allocation.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied across-contract endogeneity in two classes of insurance
markets: (1) markets with monopoly insurers and (2) markets with perfectly competitive
firms. In each case, we first characterize the optimal contracts in the market without
endogeneity and examine how the across-contract endogeneity distorts the optimal con-
tracts. Our analysis suggests that the average level of risk in a monopoly market tends to
be lower because the monopolist takes across-contract endogeneity into account and ad-
justs the level of insurance accordingly. Both types of individuals purchase less insurance
in the equilibrium and the market is less risky as a result. This is the market-wide analog
of standard arguments that moral hazard reduces optimal insurance level; the difference
is that it is the across-contract externalities that is further reducing the optimal level
of insurance. In contrast, perfectly competitive insurers consider neither the externality
exerted by the contracts nor the benefits of offering less coverage at the margin; the re-
sulting level of average risk in the market is too high and the competitive equilibrium is
constrained Pareto inefficient.
Our results suggest that there is a trade-off between the monopoly and competitive
market. This is related to a result in Mahoney and Weyl (2014), who argue that there
can be a trade-off between competition and externality reduction in selection markets.
Their mechanism is different from ours, but has a similar flavor – in our model, the
inefficiency of perfect competition stems from the failure of insurers to account for the
behavioral externality of the contracts. A monopolist generally extracts rents from the
agents due to her market power. However, our analysis establishes that in an insurance
market with interdependent risks, the monopolist takes the across-contract endogeneity
into consideration and therefore provides less insurance that results in a lower average
level of risk. In contrast, competitive insurers are price takers and make zero profit, but
they do not internalize the externality of contracts in an insurance market with across-
contract endogeneity and offer excessive insurance. The average market risk is too high
as a consequence.
Since there is a trade-off between competition and efficiency, an important direction
for future work is to characterize the precise conditions under which monopoly is preferred
to perfect competition in an insurance market with interdependent risks.13
13It is easy to come up with a one-type example in which monopoly is preferable. We construct an ex-
ample using the following functional forms and parameters: W = 5, D = 3, and h(p, p¯) = 0.025(1−0.655p¯)3(1+p)3
and u(x) = − 12x2 .
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Appendix
A Proof of a Sufficient Condition for Assumption 1
The following lemma shows a sufficient condition for the H-type first-best-contract
locus to be upward-sloping in the region of interest.
Lemma 5. Let (W,W −D) be the endowment such that for a given H type, there exists
 > 0 such that cH∗NL,R ≤ cH∗NL,R′ and cH∗L,R ≤ cH∗L,R′ for all 0 ≤ R < R′ < . Then there
exists kL < kH such that ~cH(R) only intersects the L type’s indifference curve that passes
through (W,W −D) once and ~cH(R) monotonically increases in cNL and cL with R below
the L type’s indifference curve.
Proof. Choose kL < kH . If ~cH(R) only intersects the L type’s indifference curve that
passes through (W,W −D) once and ~cH(R) monotonically increases in cNL and cL with
R below the L type’s indifference curve, then we get the required kL.
Suppose that ~cH(R) crosses the L type’s indifference curve associated with U¯L multiple
times. Let (cNL, cL) be the point at which the L type’s indifference curve intersects the
45-degree line and UˆH = UH(cNL, cL). Parametrize the set of intersections between ~cH(R)
and the H type’s indifference curve by R.
Let A = {R ∈ [0, UˆH−U¯H ] : there exists  > 0 such that cH∗NL,R′ ≥ cH∗NL,R for any R′ ∈
(R−, R) or cH∗NL,R′ ≤ cH∗NL,R for any R′ ∈ (R,R+)}, i.e., A is the collection of rents asso-
ciated with the downward sloping part of ~cH(R). Note that the slope of downward sloping
~cH(R) has to be steeper than that of the H type’s indifference curve at every intersec-
tion and thus the difference between their slopes is always positive for every intersection
associated with rents in A. Note that since the slope of the H type’s indifference curve
is continuous and that of ~cH(R) is semi-continuous, the difference is semi-continuous. A
is compact and the minimum difference m > 0 is attained at some value of R.
We assume that the slope of the indifference curve is differentiable in ki and we
know that the slope is uniformly continuous in the region of concern {(cNL, cL) : cNL ≤
W and cL ≥ W − D}. Thus there exists δ > 0 such that if kL ∈ (kH − δ, kH + δ), the
difference in slopes of the H type’s and L type’s indifference curves at every point will be
smaller than m. This guarantees that ~cH(R) only crosses the L type’s indifference curve
once.
B Proof of Proposition 1
We provide the complete proof of Proposition 1 here.
Step 1: We show that the constraint set can be simplified in the following way: (i)
(IRH) is redundant, (ii) (IRL) must bind, (iii) (ICH) must bind and (iv) (ICL) can be
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replaced with a monotonicity constraint cHNL ≤ cLNL. In other words we prove that the









pi = λpiL + (1− λ)piH (6)










cHNL ≤ cLNL. (Monotonicity)
Towards simplifying the constraint set, we first prove the following lemmas about the
properties of the indirect utility function and the profit function.
Lemma 6. The L type’s and H type’s indirect utility functions satisfy the single crossing
property.





















By the envelop theorem, ∂pi
∂cNL
= 0 and ∂pi
∂cL
= 0. Hence the last term in each expression






















since p∗L(cNL, cL) < p
∗
H(cNL, cL) at all points, by
∂h
∂p∂k
< 0. Since the L type’s indifference
curve is steeper than the H type’s indifference curve at all points, any L type’s indifference
curve can cross any H type’s indifference curve at most once, from above to below. Thus
the single crossing property is satisfied.
Lemma 7. The profit function pii(cNL, cL) is decreasing in cL, for i = H,L.
Proof. An increase in cL will affect profit in two ways: (1) a direct effect on the amount
of indemnity paid, and (2) an indirect effect on the agent’s risk level. Both effects are
negative so profit is negatively related to cL.
Taking the partial derivative of pii with respect to cL, we have
∂pii
∂cL
= −pi − ∂pi
∂cL
(cL − cNL +D) . (12)
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The first-order condition of the utility maximization gives ∂h
∂p




and p increase because ∂h
2
∂p2
> 0. Thus ∂p
∂cL
> 0. Notice that
(cL − cNL +D) is positive. As a result pii(cNL, cL) is decreasing in cL.
Step 1(i): We show that (IRH) can be dropped. (IRL) implies that the L-type
contract will lie between the vertical line cNL = W and the L type’s indifference curve
that passes through the endowment. By the single crossing property, the L-type contract
must lie above the H type’s indifference curve that passes through the endowment. (ICH)
implies that UH(cHNL, c
H
L ) ≥ UH(cLNL, cLL) ≥ U¯H . Hence (IRL), (ICH), and the single
crossing property together imply (IRH). Thus (IRH) is redundant.
Step 1(ii): Next, to show that (IRL) can be replaced by (IRL), it is useful to consider
when pooling happens if (ICH) binds.
Lemma 8. If (ICH) binds, then (ICL) binds if and only if there is a pooling contract,
i.e., the contracts for both types are identical.
Proof. (⇒) Since (ICH) binds, the L-type contract has to lie on the same H type’s
indifference curve as the the H-type contract does. (ICL) binding and the single crossing
property imply that both contracts are at the intersection of the H type’s and the L type’s
indifference curve and there is only one such point. Thus there is a pooling contract.
(⇐) If there is a pooling contract, (ICL) binds.
With Lemma 8, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. If (ICH) binds, there is separation if and only if (ICL) is slack.
We will show that (IRL) must bind by way of contradiction. Suppose that (IRL) does






L ) be the contracts offered to the L
type and the H type in the solution respectively. We will consider three cases depending
on whether (ICH) and (ICL) bind: (1) (ICH) is slack, (2) both (ICH) and (ICL) bind
and (3) (ICH) binds but (ICL) is slack.




L − ) for the
H type, where  is small enough such that UH(cHNL, c
H
L − ) ≥ UH(cLNL, cLL). (ICL) holds
because UL(cLNL, c
L
L) ≥ UL(cHNL, cHL ) ≥ UH(cHNL, cHL ) > UH(cHNL, cHL − ). With no change
in the contract offered to the L type, (IRL) holds and piL remains unchanged. By Lemma
7, piH will increase and so will the total profit pi.
Suppose both (ICH) and (ICL) bind. By Lemma 8, both types purchase the same
contract. In this case, a new pooling contract (cHNL, c
H
L − ) such that UL(cHNL, cHL − ) ≥
UL(W,W − D), for  small enough, can be offered. The constraints (IRL),(ICL) and
(ICH) are satisfied. By Lemma 7, piL and piH will increase when this new pooling contract
is offered and pi will increase as a result.
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) and a new L-type contract (cLNL, c
L
L − δ), such that UL(cLNL, cLL − δ) ≥ UL and
UH(cHNL, c
H
L )−UH(cHNL, cHL −) = UH(cLNL, cLL)−UH(cLNL, cLL−δ). Then UH(cHNL, cHL −) =
UH(cLNL, c
L
L − δ) for δ and  small enough. The single crossing property implies that
UL(cLNL, c
L
L − δ) > UL(cHNL, cHL − ). Hence (IRL), (ICH) and (ICL) are all satisfied. As
both of the new contracts involve a decrease in cL, both piL and piH will increase and
hence pi will increase.
We have reached a contradiction under all three cases, and thus (IRL) must bind in
the solution.







L ) be the optimal contracts offered to the L type and the H type
respectively.
If the H type gets U¯H in the solution, i.e., zero rent, then the H type’s indifference
curve intersects the L type’s indifference curve at the endowment point (W,W−D), since
(IRL) must bind. As (W,W − D) is the only point on the L type’s indifference curve




L) = (W,W −D).
It follows that (ICH) binds.
Suppose that the H type gets positive rents, i.e., UH(cHNL, c
H
L ) > U¯
H . For a contra-
diction we will assume that (ICH) does not bind in the solution. The L-type contract
must lie strictly below the H type’ indifference curve passing through (cHNL, c
H
L ). If the
L-type contract is kept unchanged and a new H-type contract (cHNL, c
H
L − ) such that
UH(cHNL, c
H
L − ) ≥ UH(cLNL, cLL) for  small enough, is offered, then (ICH),(ICL) and
(IRL) are satisfied, as U
L(cLNL, c
L
L) ≥ UL(cHNL, cHL ) > UL(cHNL, cHL − ). The profit piH and
pi will increase when this new set of contracts is offered, and we have a contradiction.
Hence (ICH) must bind in the solution.
Step 1(iv): The last part of step 1 is to show that (ICL) can be replaced by the
monotonicity constraint cHNL ≤ cLNL. Let (cLNL, cLL) and (cHNL, cHL ) be the contracts offered
to the L type and the H type in the solution respectively.
We will first prove that (ICL) and (ICH) together imply monotonicity. By step 1(iii),
(ICH) binds and the H type’s indifference curve will cross the L type’s indifference curve
exactly once at (cLNL, c
L





has to lie on or to the left of the L-type contract. Therefore, monotonicity has to be
satisfied.
Now, we will prove the reverse direction, i.e., (ICH) and monotonicity imply (ICL).




L ) has to be on or to the left
the left of the intersection between the H type’s indifference curve that passes through
(cHNL, c
H
L ) and the L type’s indifference curve that passes through the endowment. The
single crossing property implies that (ICL) is satisfied.
We have shown that we can simplify the set of constraints, and in particular problem
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(1) is equivalent to problem (6). Next we will decompose the simplified maximization
problem (6) into an outer and inner problem by introducing a new variable and solve the
inner problem.















L) + (1− λ)piH(cHNL, cHL ) (7)










cHNL ≤ cLNL (monotonicity)
UH = U¯H +R, (R¯)
where R is the amount of rents given to H types and R ≥ 0.
The inner problem, denoted as ALT (R), pins down the set of profit-maximizing con-
tracts that satisfies (IRL), (ICH), monotonicity and an additional constraint (R¯). The
constraint (R¯) specifies the utility of H types in the solution to be U¯H + R. The outer
problem is to choose R to maximize profits. It is clear that the solution to (6) is a solution
to the combined inner and outer problem.
Indeed, Assumption 1 ensures that the solution to ALT (R) is unique for any R. To
see this, the constraints (IRL) and (R¯) specify exactly the values of U
H and UL in the
solution and thus the corresponding H type’s and L type’s indifference curves. (ICH)
locates the L-type contract at the intersection of the two indifference curves. The insurer
will then choose a contract on the H type’s indifference curve that maximizes her profits




L,R) is the H-type first-best contract associated with rent R. Before





NL,R) be the optimal L-type and H-type contracts in the solution to ALT (R)
respectively. By Assumption 1, the upward sloping nature of ~cH(R) guarantees that there
is only one R such that the H-type first-best-contract locus ~cH(R) intersects the L type’s
indifference curve. Let RL be the associated level of rent and (cH∗NL,RL , c
H∗
L,RL) be their
intersection. Let (cNL, cL) be the intersection of the L type’s indifference curve and the
45-degree line. Let R be the rent such that UH(cNL, cL)− U¯H = R.
We are reading to characterize the solution to ALT (R) in the following lemma:
Lemma 9. The solution to ALT (R) can be characterized as follows.
1. If 0 ≤ R ≤ RL, the H-type contract is first-best with rent R; the L-type contract
provides the minimum utility to L types and U¯H +R to H types.
33
2. If RL ≤ R ≤ R, then (cLNL,R, cLNL,R) = (cHNL,R, cHNL,R); the pooling contract provides
the minimum utility to L types and U¯H +R to H types.
3. If R > R¯, there is no solution to ALT (R).
Proof. 1. For 0 ≤ R ≤ RL, the H-type first-best contract associated with R maximizes
profits on the H type and satisfies the monotonicity constraint. Thus cHNL,R = c
H∗
NL,R.
The constraint (IRL) implies that the L-type contract provides zero utility rents to




H + R. The upward sloping
nature of ~cH(R) implies that we have separating contracts if 0 ≤ R < RL.
2. If R = RL, then the H-type first-best contract (cH∗NL,RL , c
H∗
L,RL) can be offered to
both types.
If RL < R ≤ R¯, the H-type first-best-contract locus ~cH(R) lies to the right of
the L type’s indifference curve, so by monotonicity and (ICH), the H-type contract







L,R) at the intersection between the H type’s indifference
curve with rent R and the L type’s indifference curve that passes through the
endowment maximizes profits. Notice that by Assumption 1, any contract that
lies on the left of the pooling contract (cHNL,R, c
H
L,R) will yield lower profits from H
types. Thus the insurer will choose to offer the pooling contract as described above
to both types.
3. For any R > R¯, the H type’s indifference curve will not intersect the L type’s
indifference curve passing the endowment, so (ICH) cannot be satisfied for any
choices of contracts. Thus no solution exists.
Step 3: Now that we have characterized the solution to the inner problem ALT (R),
we proceed to solve the outer problem. Define pii(R) to be the profits from type i in the
solution to ALT (R) when the rent given to H types is R.
The outer problem can be written as
max
R
pi(R, λ) = λpiL(R) + (1− λ)piH(R) (13)
subject to 0 ≤ R ≤ R¯. (14)
Since piL(R) and piH(R) are continuous, pi(R, λ) is also continuous. Define
R∗(λ) = arg max
R∈[0,R¯]
pi(R, λ).
By the Theorem of the Maximum, R∗(λ) is nonempty for all λ and is upper hemicon-
tinuous. Let RM be the rent such that UH(cL∗NL, c
L∗
L ) = U¯ + R






piL is the L type’s first-best zero-rent contract.
14. The following lemma shows
how profits from each type changes with rents to the H type.
Lemma 10. piL(R) is nondecreasing for 0 ≤ R ≤ RM and non-increasing for RM ≤ R ≤
R¯. piH(R) is decreasing for 0 ≤ R ≤ R¯.
Proof. By Assumption 1, piL(R) is nondecreasing for 0 ≤ R ≤ RM and non-increasing for
RM ≤ R ≤ R¯.
We show piH(R) is decreasing in R by contradiction. Suppose that there exists R
′ > R
such that piH(R
′) ≥ piH(R). Let (cHNL,R, cHNL,R) and (cLNL,R, cLNL,R) be the contracts offered
to H types and L types respectively in the solution to ALT (R). We consider two cases:
(1) (cHNL,R, c
H




NL,R) is not first-best.
Consider (cHNL,R′ , c
H
NL,R′ − ) such that UH(cHNL,R′ , cHL,R′ − ) = UH(cHNL,R, cHL,R). If
(cHNL,R, c
H




L,R′ − ) > piH(R′) ≥ piH(R), where the first
inequality follows from Lemma 7, violates that (cHNL,R, c
H
L,R) is the first-best contract
associated with R. If (cHNL,R, c
H
L,R) is not first-best, we must have R
′ > R ≥ RL by Lemma
9 and thus cHNL,R′ < c
H




L,R′−) > piH(R′) ≥ piH(R) implies
that (cHNL,R′ , c
H
L,R′ − ) lies on the left of (cHNL,R, cHL,R) on the same H type’s indifference
curve and yields higher profits. This violates that (cHNL,R, c
H
L,R) is a solution to ALT (R).
It follows that we can restrict our attention to rents not greater than RM .
Corollary 2. If R > RM , then R /∈ R∗(λ) for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists R > RM such that R ∈ R∗(λ) for
some λ. Then by optimality of R, we have
λpiL(R) + (1− λ)piH(R) ≥ λpiL(RM) + (1− λ)piH(RM).
Rearranging, we get
λ(piL(R)− piL(RM)) + (1− λ)(piH(R)− piH(R)) ≥ 0. (15)
By Lemma 10, piL(R) ≤ piL(RM) and piH(R) < piH(RM), and this contradicts the
inequality (15). Thus R /∈ R∗(λ).
This proves that the constraint (14) can be replaced by 0 ≤ R ≤ RM . In other words,
any R > RM is never an optimal value of rents given to H types to maximize profits, so
we can narrow down the range of rents to be considered in our analysis.
14Due to moral hazard, we have RM < R¯
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Before solving the outer problem, it is useful to consider the optimal rent when there is
only one type in the market, i.e., λ = 0 or λ = 1. When λ = 0, we have pi(R, 0) = piH(R).
Since there are only H types in the market, this is equivalent to the first-best problem
of the H type. It is obvious that R∗(0) = {0}. When λ = 1, we have pi(R, 0) = piL(R).
Since there are only L types in the market, this is equivalent to the first-best problem of
the L type. Thus R∗(1) = {RM}.
To study the comparative statics of R∗ with respect to λ, we have to consider two
cases: (1) RM < RL and (2) RM ≥ RL.
The following lemmas show that it is possible to relate λ to R8 and the comparative
statics of the inner problem can be carried over.
Lemma 11. pi(R, λ) satisfies increasing differences in (R, λ).
Proof. Let R′ > R and λ′ > λ.
Then
pi(R′, λ′)− pi(R′, λ) = (λ′ − λ)piL(R′) + (λ− λ′)piH(R′)
and
pi(R, λ′)− pi(R, λ) = (λ′ − λ)piL(R) + (λ− λ′)piH(R).
By Lemma 10, piL is nondecreasing in R and piH is decreasing in R. So
pi(R′, λ′)− pi(R′, λ) > pi(R, λ′)− pi(R, λ) and
pi(R′, λ′)− pi(R, λ′) > pi(R′, λ)− pi(R, λ).
By Topkis’s theorem, R∗(λ) is non-decreasing in λ in the strong set order. We will
prove some properties of R∗ that are useful for doing comparative statics in the following
lemma.
Lemma 12. R∗ satisfies the following properties:
1. For any R ∈ (0, RM) and λ 6= λ′, R /∈ R∗(λ) ∩R∗(λ′);
2. s(λ) = sup{R∗(λ)} is nondecreasing in λ;
3. g(λ) = inf{R∗(λ)} is nondecreasing in λ;
4. If λ′ > λ, then h(λ′) ≥ s(λ).
Proof. 1. For a contradiction, suppose that R ∈ R∗(λ1) ∩ R∗(λ2) where λ1 < λ2. We
will look into two cases: (i) R < RL and (ii) R ≥ RL. Let








L )− UH(cLNL, cLL)) + γ(cLNL − cHNL)
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be the Lagrangian for problem (6), where α, β and γ are the Lagrange multipliers
associated with (IRL) , (ICH) and the monotonicity constraint respectively.
For R < RL, let (cHNL, c
H




L) be the optimal contracts associated with
R for H types and L types respectively. Note that since monotonicity does not
bind for this allocation, the multiplier γ = 0. For a small change ∆R > 0, the new















a directional derivative of L in the direction δ = (∆HNL,∆HL ,∆LNL,∆LL), we have
∇δL(cHNL, cHL , cLNL, cLL)










L )− UH(cLNL, cLL)
)
+ γ∇δ(cLNL − cHNL)
= λ1∇δpiL + (1− λ1)∇δpiH
= 0.
The last three terms are zero because (ICH) and (IRL) are satisfied and γ = 0.
Since (cHNL, c
H




L) is a solution to the problem (6) for λ1, the directional
derivative equals zero. Since R is also a maximizer for λ2, we have
λ2∇δpiL + (1− λ2)∇δpiH = 0.
By Lemma 10, ∇δpiL is non-negative since the change in profits associated with
this increase in rent is non-negative, while ∇δpiH is negative since the change in
profits associated with this increase in rent is negative. There can only be one λ
that satisfies the equality, and we have reached a contradiction.
For R ≥ RL, let (cHNL, cHL ) and (cLNL, cLL) be the optimal contracts associated with R
for H types and L types respectively. By Lemma 9, the two contracts are identical.





















∇δL(cHNL, cHL , cLNL, cLL)










L )− UH(cLNL, cLL)
)
+ γ∇δ(cLNL − cHNL)
= λ1∇δpiL + (1− λ1)∇δpiH
= 0.
The last three terms are zero because (IRL) and (ICH) are satisfied and mono-
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tonicity binds. Since (cHNL, c
H




L) is a solution to the problem (6) for λ1,
the directional derivative equals zero. Since R is also a maximizer for λ2,
λ2∇δpiL + (1− λ2)∇δpiH = 0.
Similarly, there are no two distinct values of λ that satisfy the two equalities, thus
we have a contradiction.
2. True by Topkis’s Theorem.
3. True by Topkis’s Theorem.
4. If λ = 0, the s(λ) = 0 and it is clear that g(λ′) ≥ s(λ).
Suppose λ 6= 0. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose there exists λ′ > λ such
that g(λ′) < s(λ). Optimality of s(λ) implies










Rearranging the equation gives
λ′piL(s(λ)) + (1− λ′)piH(s(λ)) > λ′piL(g(λ′)) + (1− λ′)piH(g(λ′)).
This implies g(λ′) /∈ R∗(λ′) and we have arrived at a contradiction. Thus g(λ′) ≥
s(λ) for all λ′ > λ.
Lemma 13. There exists λ such that
1. 0 ∈ R∗(λ);
2. If λ > λ, then 0 /∈ R∗(λ);
3. If λ < λ, then R∗(λ) = {0}.
Proof. 1. Let T = {λ : 0 ∈ R∗(λ)}. T is nonempty because 0 ∈ T and is bounded
above by 1. By completeness of R, supT exists. Let λ = supT . Upper hemiconti-
nuity implies λ ∈ T .
2. If λ > λ, we have 0 /∈ R∗(λ) by definition of supremum.
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3. From part (1), 0 ∈ R∗(λ) implies g(λ) = 0. Lemma 12 implies that if λ < λ, then
g(λ) ≤ s(λ) ≤ g(λ¯) = 0. Thus g(λ) = s(λ) = 0 and R∗(λ) = {0}.
Lemma 14. Suppose RM > RL > 0. There exists λ¯ such that
1. If λ < λ¯, then RL /∈ R∗(λ);
2. If λ > λ¯, then R∗(λ) ⊆ [RL, RM ].
Proof. Let T = {λ : s(λ) ≤ RL}. T is nonempty, because 0 ∈ T . T is bounded above by
1, so supT exists. Let λ¯ = supT .
1. We will consider two cases: (i) λ¯ ∈ T¯ and (ii) λ¯ /∈ T¯ .
Suppose λ¯ ∈ T¯ . If s(λ¯) = 0, λ¯ ≤ λ and it is clear that RL /∈ R∗(λ) for λ < λ¯. For
s(λ¯) > 0, by Lemma 12 we have s(λ) < s(λ¯) ≤ RL for all λ < λ¯.
For λ¯ /∈ T¯ , suppose for a contradiction that there exists λ < λ¯ such that RL ∈ R∗(λ).
Note that λ is necessarily an upper bound for T¯ , since by Lemma 12, we have
s(λ′) > s(λ) ≥ RL if λ′ ∈ (λ, λ¯). We have a contradiction.
2. By definition of T¯ , if λ > λ¯, then g(λ) ≥ s(λ − ) > RL for some  such that
λ−  > λ¯. Thus R∗(λ) ⊆ [RL, RM ].
Hence our choice of λ¯ is sup T¯ satisfies all the conditions.
Finally we can characterize the optimal contracts in the two cases: (1) RM < RL and
(2) RM ≥ RL.
Case (1) is straightforward – since the possible range of R is from 0 to RM , then
RM < RL means that the optimal rent must be less that RM . By Lemma 13, there exists
λ ≥ 0 such that R∗(λ) = {0} if λ < λ, meaning that only H types purchase the first-best
contract with zero utility rents and L types do not participate in the market. If λ > λ,
then H types purchase the first-best contract with a positive rent while L types purchase
a zero-rent contract. In this case, λ¯ > 1 and there will be no pooling contracts.
For case (2), if RM ≥ RL, Lemma 13 gives λ such that when 0 ≤ λ < λ only H types
purchases the first-best contract and L types do not. Lemma 14 gives λ¯. If λ < λ < λ¯,
the H-type contract will be first-best with positive rents and the L-type contract gives
zero rent to L types. If λ ≥ λ¯, the optimal rent will be no less than RL, the minimum
level of rent for a pooling contract. Thus the H-type and L-type contracts are the same.
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C Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose (cNL, cL) and p¯ is a solution to the optimization problem (10). Consider
a small movement of the contract to (c′NL, c
′
L) in the direction δ, holding utility and p¯
constant, that results in a decrease in p∗, i.e., p∗(c′NL, c
′
L) < p
∗(cNL, cL). Graphically, this
corresponds to an inward movement of the contract along the indifference curve towards
the endowment point. The change in the value of the Lagrangian is
∇δL = ∇δpi + α∇δ (U(cNL, cL; p¯)− U(W,W −D; p¯)) + µ∇δ (p∗(cNL, cL; p¯)− p¯)
= ∇δpi + µ∇δ (p∗(c′NL, c′L; p¯)− p¯) .
The term associated with α equals zero since (IR) binds under the movement. The
optimality of the solution implies that ∇δL = 0. Rearranging the equation, we have
∇δpi = −µ∇δ (p∗(cNL, cL; p¯)− p¯) .
If µ > 0, then ∇δpi > 0. Given a fixed p¯, this particular movement of contract would
be profitable for the insurer. If she could ignore the consistency constraint, she would
want to choose a contract that yields a lower p∗ to increase profits. The contract is thus
distorted upward. The positive sign of µ acts as a penalty for violating the consistency
constraint in the way described.
A similar argument can be made to show that the optimal one-type contract with
endogeneity is distorted downward if µ < 0.
D Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the Lagrangian for the simplified problem is























L; p¯) + (1− λ)p∗H(cHNL, cHL ; p¯)− p¯
)
. (9)
First, we look into the case of separating contracts. Note that since monotonicity does
not bind, the multiplier γ is zero. Let (cHNL, c
H








L ) 6= (cLNL, cLL),
be the solution to monopoly’s endogenous problem and p¯ be the associated optimal
average level of risk.
To evaluate the distortion on the H type’s contract, we take the directional derivative
of the Lagrangian (equation 9) in the direction δ = (∆cHNL,∆c
H
L , 0, 0), keeping p¯ and U
H
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Figure 16: µ is positive Figure 17: µ is negative
constant and L-type contract unchanged:







L; p¯) + (1− λ)p∗H(cHNL, cHL ; p¯)− p¯
)
= (1− λ)∇δpiH + µ(1− λ)∇δp∗H
= 0.
The terms associated with α and β are zero because both (IRL) and (ICH) are satisfied
under the change. Since γ = 0, the term associated with the monotonicity constraint
is zero. The L-type contract remains unchanged, so ∇δpiL = 0. Since (cHNL, cHL ) and
(cLNL, c
L
L) is a solution to the endogenous problem, the change in value of the Lagrangian
equals zero.
If µ is positive, consider an inward movement of the H-type contract towards the
endowment point, i.e., ∆cHNL > 0 and ∆c
H
L < 0. Refer to Figure 16. Since ∇δp∗H < 0, we
have (1−λ)∇δpiH > 0 and the H-type contract cannot be at the tangency point between
the iso-profit curve and the H type’s indifference curve. Thus (cHNL, c
H
L ) cannot be an
optimal H-type contract in the exogenous problem with p¯. In particular, the H-type
contract is s-distorted upward and lies to the left of the tangency point.
If µ is negative, consider an outward movement of the H-type contract away from
the endowment point, i.e., ∆cHNL < 0 and and ∆c
H
L > 0. Refer to Figure 17. Since
∇δp∗H > 0, we have (1−λ)∇δpiH > 0 and the H-type contract cannot be at the tangency
point between the iso-profit curve and the H type’s indifference curve. Thus (cHNL, c
H
L )
cannot be an optimal H-type contract in the exogenous problem with p¯. In particular,
the H-type contract is s-distorted downward and lies to the right of the tangency point.
To evaluate the distortion on the L type’s contract, we will take the directional deriva-








Figure 18: µ is positive Figure 19: µ is negative
p¯, UL and p∗H constant and ICH satisfied, i.e.,





+ µ∇δ (λp∗L + (1− λ)p∗H)
= λ∇δpiL + (1− λ)∇δpiH + µλ∇δp∗L
= 0.
The terms associated with α and β are zero because both (IRL) and (ICH) bind under
the change. Since γ = 0, the term associated with the monotonicity constraint equals
zero. Since (cHNL, c
H




L) is a solution to the endogenous problem, the change
in value of the Lagrangian equals zero.
If µ is positive, consider a movement of the H-type contract down along the iso-
probability line to the left and the L-type contract down along the indifference curve to
the right, i.e. ∆cHNL < 0, ∆c
H
L < 0, ∆c
L
NL > 0 and ∆c
L
L < 0. Refer to Figure 18. Under
this change, µλ∇δp∗L < 0 and thus λ∇δpiL+(1−λ)∇δpiH > 0. This implies that (cHNL, cHL )
and (cLNL, c
L
L) cannot be a solution to the exogenous problem with p¯. It is clear that the
L-type contract is s-distorted upward.
If µ is negative, consider a movement of the H-type contract up along the iso-
probability line to the right and the L-type contract up along the indifference curve
to the left, i.e., ∆cHNL > 0, ∆c
H
L > 0, ∆c
L
NL < 0 and ∆c
L
L > 0. Refer to Figure 19. Under
this change, µλ∇δp∗L < 0 and thus λ∇δpiL+(1−λ)∇δpiH > 0. This implies that (cHNL, cHL )
and (cLNL, c
L
L) cannot be a solution to the exogenous problem with p¯. It is clear that the
L-type contract is s-distorted downward.
Second, we look at the distortion on a pooling contract. Let (cHNL, c
H











L), be the solution to endogenous problem (8) and p¯ be the
associated optimal average level of risk.
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Figure 20: µ is positive Figure 21: µ is negative
We will take the directional derivative of the Lagrangian in the direction δ = (∆cNL,∆cL,
∆cNL,∆cL), keeping p¯ and U
L constant, i.e.,
∇δL = λ∇δpiL + (1− λ)∇δpiH + α · 0 + β · 0 + γ∇δ (cNL − cNL)
+ µ∇δ (λ∆p∗L + (1− λ)∆p∗H)
= λ∇δpiL + (1− λ)∇δpiH + µ (λ∇δp∗L + (1− λ)∇δp∗H)
= 0
The terms associated with α and β are zero because both (IRL) and (ICH) are satisfied
under the change. Note that monotonicity also binds. Since (cHNL, c
H





solution to the endogenous problem, the change in value of the Lagrangian equals zero.
If µ is positive, consider a movement of the pooling contract down along the L type’s
indifference curve to the right, i.e. ∆cNL > 0 and ∆cL < 0. Under this change, ∇δp∗L < 0
and ∇δp∗H < 0 imply that λ∇δpiL + (1 − λ)∇δpiH > 0. We have shown that the pooling
contract (cHNL, c
H




L) cannot be a solution to the exogenous problem with p¯ and
the pooling contract is p-distorted upward.
If µ is negative, consider a movement of the pooling contract up along the L type’s
indifference curve to the left, i.e., ∆cNL < 0 and ∆cL > 0. Under this change, ∇δp∗L > 0
and ∇δp∗H > 0 imply that λ∇δpiL + (1 − λ)∇δpiH > 0. We have shown that the pooling
contract (cHNL, c
H




L) cannot be a solution to the exogenous problem with p¯ and
the pooling contract is p-distorted downward.
We have proved that if p¯ is the optimal average risk in the endogenous solution, then
the optimal contracts in the monopoly’s endogenous problem are not a solution to the
monopoly’s exogenous problem with p¯. Contracts of both types are distorted away from
their respective allocations in the exogenous problem. Specifically, the H type’s and L
type’s contracts are s- or p-distorted upward when µ is positive while both are s- or
p-distorted downward when µ is negative.
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E Proof of Lemma 2
We first prove the contrapositive of the forward direction of the claim. Suppose
that a leftward movement of the H-type contract (cHNL, c
H
L ) from the pooling zero-profit
contract (cNL, cL) along the H type’s indifference curve U
H raises profits from H types.
To maintain the zero-profit constraint, profits from L types must decrease. This implies a
movement of the L-type contract to the right to (cLNL, c
L
L). The new L-type contract will
give L types higher utility, by the single crossing property. Thus the pooling zero-profit
contract (cNL, cL) is not the U
L-maximizing allocation for this particular UH .
For values of UH where moving the H-type contract to the left of the pooling zero-
profit contract is profitable, the optimal H-type contract is one that maximizes H type’s
profits on the indifference curve UH . Graphically, it is at the intersection of the H-
type profit maximization curve and the indifference curve UH , where the iso-profit curve
is tangent to the indifference curve. The UL-maximizing contract is the point on the
indifference curve UH that yields profits of −1−λ
λ
piH (for λ ∈ (0, 1]) from L types.
Clearly, this choice of L-type contract (cLNL, c
L





(ICH), monotonicity and the zero-profit constraint. To see why the L-type contract
maximizes UL, first observe that the L type’s utility increases from the left to right
along the indifference curve UH by the single crossing property and that any point to
the right of (cLNL, c
L
L) results in lower profits from L types. Therefore for this particular
H-type contract, the L-type contract (cLNL, c
L
L) maximizes U
L. Moreover, any other H-
type contract on this indifference curve will yield lower profits from H types and thus
raise the required value of profits from L types. The corresponding L-type contract will
necessarily lie on the left of (cLNL, c
L
L) and yield a lower U
L.
We now prove the backward direction of our previous claim, that the pooling zero-
profit contract will maximize the L type’s utility if moving the H-type contract from the
pooling zero-profit contract to the left does not increase profits. With the assumption of
single-peakedness of profit along an indifference curve, such a movement will not increase
profits when the H type’s profit maximization point lies on the right of the pooling
zero-profit contract (cNL, cL).
15 If we pick the H type’s profit maximization point as the
H-type contract, there will be no L-type contract that yields a zero aggregate profit and
satisfies monotonicity at the same time. By similar reasoning, any H-type contract that
lies on the right of (cNL, cL) is not feasible. On the other hand, if we move the H-type
contract to the left, the possible candidates for the L-type contract will necessarily lie
on the left of (cNL, cL) and yield a lower U
L. Hence for these values of UH , the pooling
zero-profit contract maximizes the L type’s utility.
15If the H type’s profit-maximizing contract coincide with the pooling zero-profit contract, then it is
clear that the pooling zero-profit contract is the UL-maximizing L-type contract.
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Figure 22: A movement of contracts that improves profits without
leaving any type worse off







L ) be the MWS contracts with endogeneity and p¯
MWS be
the associated level of average risk. Let UH and UL be the indirect utilities of H types







a solution to the program F with p¯MWS and U˜H(p¯MWS).
Suppose there is a slight decrease in p¯. Consider a small movement of the H-type con-








L ) respectively, holding U
H constant




L ) ≥ piH(cHNL, cHL ). Refer to Figure 22. Note that
each type’s indifference curve after the decrease in p¯, holding utility constant, is strictly
below the original indifference curve.
We will show that L types are not worse off purchasing (cLNL, c
L′
L ). The assump-
tion about ηp,p¯ allows us to compare the amount of vertical shift of the two indifference
curves at the original L-type contract. Particularly, the amount of vertical shift of the









∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣(u(cLL)− u(cLNL))p¯u′(cLL) ηip,p¯.
∣∣∣∣
Since
∣∣ηHp,p¯∣∣ ≤ ∣∣ηLp,p¯∣∣ at (cLNL, cLL), we have ∣∣∣∣ ∂UH∂p¯∂UH
∂cL
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ ∂UL∂p¯∂UL
∂cL
∣∣∣∣. This implies that the vertical
shift of the L type’s indifference curve is as least as great as the vertical shift of the H
type’s indifference curve at (cLNL, c
L
L) and thus U
L(cLNL, c
L′
L ) ≥ UL.16
16For the subclass h(p
α
p¯ ), the vertical shifts of the indifference curves for both types will be exactly
the same. Our results also apply to a related class of cost functions h( (1−p)
α
1−p¯ ), which exhibits constant
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This new set of contracts yields the same or greater utility for both types and an
overall positive profits. Thus dF (p¯
MWS ;U˜H(p¯MWS))
dp¯
< 0. Note that although the optimal
MWS contracts depicted in Figure 22 are distinct, the proof goes through the case when
the contracts are identical.
G Proof of Proposition 3
Let ~cH , ~cL be the MWS contracts with endogeneity and the p¯MWS be the associated
level of average risk in endogenous MWS equilibrium.
Since the program G differs from F by the consistency constraint, we have G(p¯, UH) ≤
F (p¯, UH) for any pair of (p¯, UH). The MWS allocation (~cH , ~cL) is an optimal al-
location of the program F with (p¯MWS, U˜H(p¯MWS)) and also satisfies the program G
with (p¯MWS, U˜H(p¯MWS)), because the consistency constraint is satisfied by the defi-
nition of an MWS endogenous allocation. We know that F (p¯MWS, U˜H(p¯MWS)) and
G(p¯MWS, U˜H(p¯MWS)) are the L-type utilities at the optimal allocations in program F
and G respectively. Therefore F (p¯MWS, U˜H(p¯MWS)) = G(p¯MWS, U˜H(p¯MWS)).
It follows that the multiplier on the consistency constraint in the program G must be
zero. If it is nonzero, when the monotonicity constraint does not bind, a movement of
the H-type contract along the H type’s indifference curve would change the value of the
program because of its effect on the consistency constraint, while leaving the objective
and other constraints unchanged. When monotonicity binds and (MUH) does not, a
movement of the pooling contract along the downward sloping pooled zero-profit curve
will change the value of the program because of its effect on the consistency constraint,








where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.
compensated elasticity of 1− p with respect to 1− p¯, i.e., η1−p,1−p¯ = 1−p¯1−p ∂(1−p)∂(1−p¯)
∣∣
h
= a for some constant
a. This class of functions guarantees that the magnitude of the horizontal shift of the indifference curve
at a point to be the same for both types, which implies a greater vertical shift of the indifference curve
at the point for L types than for H types.
17It is not possible for both monotonicity and (MUH) to bind at the the equilibrium – if both types
wish to purchase insurance, then the binding of MUH necessarily implies that the contracts are distinct
because the type-i contract has to lie on type i’s iso-profit curve associated with pii = 0.
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